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INTRODUCTION
One of the crucial questions in studying language in society is, 'How many ways of using language are there?' Most of the attempts to answer that question suffer from an unclarity about what constitutes a use of language in the first place. If you believe, as I do, that the basic unit of human linguistic communication is the illocutionary act, then the most important form of the original question will be, 'How many categories of illocutionary acts are there?' This article attempts to answer that question.
The primary purpose of this paper, then, is to develop a reasoned classification of illocutionary acts into certain basic categories or types. Since any such attempt to develop a taxonomy must take into account Austin's classification of illocutionary acts into his five basic categories of verdictive, expositive, exercitive, behabitive, and commissive, a second purpose of this paper is to assess Austin's classification to show in what respects it is adequate and in what respects inadequate. Furthermore, since basic semantic differences are likely to have syntactical consequences, a third purpose of this paper is to show how these different basic illocutionary types are realized in the syntax of a natural language such as English.
In what follows, I shall presuppose a familiarity with the general pattern of analysis of illocutionary acts offered in such works as Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Searle, Speech Acts, and Searle, 'Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts'. In particular, I shall presuppose a distinction between the illocutionary force of an utterance and its propositional content as symbolized F(p). The aim of this paper then is to classify the different types of F.
II. DIFFERENT TYPES OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS
Any taxonomical effort of this sort presupposes criteria for distinguishing one (kind of) illocutionary act from another. What are the criteria by which we can tell that of three actual utterances one is a report, one a prediction and one a promise? In order to develop higher order genera, we must first know how the species promise, prediction, report, etc., differ one from another. When one attempts to answer that question one discovers that there are several quite different principles of distinction; that is, there are different kinds of differences that enable us to say that the force of this utterance is different from the force of that utterance. For this reason the metaphor of force in the expression 'illocutionary force' is misleading since it suggests that different illocutionary forces occupy different positions on a single continuum of force. What is actually the case is that there are several distinct criss-crossing continua. A related source of confusion is that we are inclined to confuse illocutionary verbs with types of illocutionary acts. We are inclined, for example, to think that where we have two nonsynonymous illocutionary verbs they must necessarily mark two different kinds of illocutionary acts. In what follows, I shall try to keep a clear distinction between illocutionary verbs and illocutionary acts. Illocutions are a part of language as opposed to particular languages. Illocutionary verbs are always part of a particular language: French, German, English, or whatnot. Differences in illocutionary verbs are a good guide but by no means a sure guide to differences in illocutionary acts.
It seems to me there are (at least) twelve significant dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts differ one from another and I shall -all too briskly -list them:
(i) Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act The point or purpose of an order can be specified by saying that it is an attempt to get the hearer to do something. The point or purpose of a description is that it is a representation (true or false, accurate or inaccurate) of how something is. The point or purpose of a promise is that it is an undertaking of an obligation by the speaker to do something. These differences correspond to the essential conditions in my analysis of illocutionary acts in Speech Acts (Searle 1969: Ch. 3). Ultimately, I believe, essential conditions form the best basis for a taxonomy, as I shall attempt to show. It is important to notice that the terminology of 'point' or 'purpose' is not meant to imply, nor is it based on the view, that every illocutionary act has a definitionally associated perlocutionary intent. For many, perhaps most, of the most important illocutionary acts, there is no essential perlocutionary intent associated by definition with the corresponding verb, e.g. statements and promises are not by definition attempts to produce perlocutionary effects in hearers.
The point or purpose of a type of illocution I shall call its illocutionary point. Illocutionary point is part of but not the same as illocutionary force. Thus, e.g., the illocutionary point of request is the same as that of commands: both are attempts to get hearers to do something. But the illocutionary forces are clearly different. In general, one can say that the notion of illocutionary force is the resultant of several elements of which illocutionary point is only one, though, I believe, the most important one.
(2) Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world Some illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly -their propositional content) to match the world, others to get the world to match the words. Assertions are in the former category, promises and requests are in the latter. The best illustration of this distinction I know of is provided by Miss Anscombe (I957). Suppose a man goes to the supermarket with a shopping list given him by his wife on which are written the words 'beans, butter, bacon, and bread'. Suppose as he goes around with his shopping cart selecting these items, he is followed by a detective who writes down everything he takes. As they emerge from the store both shopper and detective will have identical lists. But the function of the two lists will be quite different. In the case of the shopper's list, the purpose of the list is, so to speak, to get the world to match the words; the man is supposed to make his actions fit the list. In the case of the detective, the purpose of the list is to make the words match the world; the man is supposed to make the list fit the actions of the shopper. This can be further demonstrated by observing the role of 'mistake' in the two cases. If the detective gets home and suddenly realizes that the man bought pork chops instead of bacon, he can simply erase the word 'bacon' and write 'pork chops'. But if the shopper gets home and his wife points out he has bought pork chops when he should have bought bacon he cannot correct the mistake by erasing 'bacon' from the list and writing 'pork chops'.
In these examples the list provides the propositional content of the illocution and the illocutionary force determines how that content is supposed to relate to the world. I propose to call this difference a difference in direction of fit. (6) Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the speaker and the hearer Consider, for example, the differences between boasts and laments, between congratulations and condolences. In these two pairs, one hears the difference as being between what is or is not in the interests of the speaker and hearer respectively. This feature is another type of preparatory condition according to the analysis in Speech Acts.
(7) Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse Some performative expressions serve to relate the utterance to the rest of the discourse (and also to the surrounding context). Consider, for example 'I reply', 'I deduce', 'I conclude', and 'I object'. These expressions serve to relate utterances to other utterances and to the surrounding context. The features they mark seem mostly to involve utterances within the class of statements. In addition to simply stating a proposition, one may state it by way of objecting to what someone else has said, by way of replying to an earlier point, by way of deducing it from certain evidentiary premises, etc. 'However', 'moreover' and 'therefore' also perform these discourse-relating functions.
(8) Differences in propositional content that are determined by illocutionary forceindicating devices The differences, for example, between a report and a prediction involve the fact that a prediction must be about the future whereas a report can be about the past S or present. These differences correspond to differences in propositional content conditions as explained in Speech Acts.
(g) Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be, but need not be performed as speech acts For example, one may classify things by saying 'I classify this as an A and this as a B'. But one need not say anything at all in order to be classifying; one may simply throw all the A's in the A box and all the B's in the B box. Similarly with estimate, diagnose and conclude. I may make estimates, give diagnoses and draw conclusions in saying 'I estimate', 'I diagnose', and 'I conclude' but in order to estimate, diagnose or conclude it is not necessary to say anything at all. I may simply stand before a building and estimate its height, silently diagnose you as a marginal schizophrenic, or conclude that the man sitting next to me is quite drunk. In these cases, no speech acts not even an internal speech act, is necessary. Among the examples Austin lists are: apologize, thank, deplore, commiserate, congratulate, felicitate, welcome, applaud, criticize, bless, curse, toast and drink. But also, curiously: dare, defy, protest, and challenge.
The first thing to notice about these lists is that they are not classifications of illocutionary acts but of English illocutionary verbs. Austin seems to assume that a classification of different verbs is eo ipso a classification of kinds of illocutionarv acts, that any two non-synonymous verbs must mark different illocutionary acts. But there is no reason to suppose that this is the case. As we shall see, some verbs, for example, mark the manner in which an illocutionary act is performed, for example 'announce'. One may announce orders, promises and reports, but announcing is not on all fours with ordering, promising and reporting. Announcing, to anticipate a bit, is not the name of a type of illocutionary act, but of the way in which some illocutionary act is performed. An announcement is never just an announcement. It must also be a statement, order, etc.
Even granting that the lists are of illocutionary verbs and not necessarily of different illocutionary acts, it seems to me, one can level the following criticisms against it. (e) Related to these objections is the further difficulty that not all of the verbs listed within the classes really satisfy the definitions given, even if we take the definitions in the rather loose and suggestive manner that Austin clearly intends. Thus 'nominate', 'appoint' and 'excommunicate' are not 'giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action', much less are they 'advocating' it. Rather they are, as Austin himself might have said, performances of these actions, not advocacies of anything. That is, in the sense in which we might agree that ordering, commanding and urging someone to do something are all cases of advocating that he do it, we can not also agree that nominating or appointing is also advocating. When I appoint you chairman, I don't advocate that you be or become chairman; I make you chairman.
In sum, there are (at least) six related difficulties with Austin's taxonomy; in ascending order of importance: there is a persistent confusion between verbs and acts, not all the verbs are illocutionary verbs, there is too much overlap of the categories, too much heterogeneity within the categories, many of the verbs listed in the categories don't satisfy the definition given for the category and, most important, there is no consistent principle of classification.
I don't believe I have fully substantiated all six of these charges and I will not attempt to do so within the confines of this paper, which has other aims. I believe, however, that my doubts about Austin's taxonomy will have greater clarity and force after I have presented an alternative. What I propose to do is take illocutionary point, and its corollaries, direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions, as the basis for constructing a classification. In such a classification, other features -the role of authority, discourse relations, etc. -will fall into their appropriate places.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TAXONOMY

In this section, I shall present a list of what I regard as the basic categories of illocutionary acts. In so doing, I shall discuss briefly how my classification relates to Austin's.
Representatives. The point or purpose of the members of the representative class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. All of the members of the representative class are assessable on the dimension of assessment which includes true and false. Using Frege's assertion sign to mark the illocutionary point common to all and the symbols introduced above, we may symbolize this class as follows:
F 4 B(p).
The direction of fit is words to the world; the psychological state expressed is Belief (that p). It is important to emphasize that words such as 'belief' and 'commitment' are here intended to mark dimensions; they are so to speak determinable rather than determinates. Thus, there is a difference between suggesting that p or putting it forward as a hypothesis that p on the one hand and insisting that p or solemnly swearing that p on the other. The degree of belief and commitment may approach or even reach zero, but it is clear or will become clear, that hypothesizing that p and flatly stating that p are in the same line of business in a way that neither is like requesting.
Once we recognize the existence of representatives as a quite separate class, based on the notion of illocutionary point, than the existence of a large number of performative verbs that denote illocutions that seem to be assessable ian the True-False dimension and yet are not just 'statements' will be easily explicable in terms of the fact that they mark features of illocutionary force which are in addition to illocutionary point. Thus, for example, consider: 'boast' and 'complain'. They both denote representatives with the added feature that they have something to do with the interest of the speaker (condition (6) above). 'Conclude' and 'deduce' are also representatives with the added feature that they mark certain relations between the representative illocutionary act and the rest of the discourse or the context of utterance (condition (7) above). This class will contain most of Austin's expositives and many of his verdictives as well for the, by now I hope obvious, reason that they all have the same illocutionary point and differ only in other features of illocutionary force.
The simplest test of a representative is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia) as true or false. I hasten to add that this will give neither necessary nor sufficient conditions, as we shall see when we get to my fifth class.
These points about representatives will, I hope, be clearer when I discuss my second class which, with some reluctance, I will call Directives. The illocutionary point of these consists in the fact that they are attempts (of varying degrees, and hence, more precisely, they are determinates of the determinable which includes attempting) by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. They may be very modest 'attempts' as when I invite you to do it or suggest that you do it, or they may be very fierce attempts as when I insist that you do it. Using the shriek mark for the illocutionary point indicating device for the members of this class generally, we have the following symbolism:
! t W (H does A)
The direction of fit is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is want (or wish or desire). The propositional content is always that the hearer H does some future action A. Verbs denoting members of this class are ask,2 order, command, request, beg, plead, pray, entreat, and also invite, permit, and advise. I think also that it is clear that dare, defy and challenge, which Austin lists as behabitives, are in this class. Many of Austin's exercitives are also in this class.
Commissives. Austin's definition of commissives seems to me unexceptionable, and I will simply appropriate it as it stands with the cavil that several of the verbs he lists as commissive verbs do not belong in this class at all, such as 'shall', 'intend', 'favor', and others. Commissives then are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker (again in varying degrees) to some future course of action. Using C for the members of this class, generally we have the following symbolism:
C T I (S does A)
The direction of fit is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is Intention. The propositional content is always that the speaker S does some future action A. Since the direction of fit is the same for commissives and directives, it would [2] Questions are a species of directives since they are attempts by S to get H to answeri.e. to perform a speech act.
give us a simpler taxonomy if we could show that they are really members of the same category. I am unable to do this because, whereas the point of a promise is to commit the speaker to doing something (and not necessarily to try to get himself to do it), the point of a request is to try to get the hearer to do something (and not necessarily to commit or obligate him to do it). In order to assimilate the two categories, one would have to show that promises are really a species of requests to oneself (this has been suggested to me by Julian Boyd), or alternatively one would have to show that requests placed the hearer under an obligation (this has been suggested to me by William Alston and John Kearns). I have been unable to make either of these analyses work and am left with the inelegant solution of two separate categories with the same direction of fit. A fourth category I shall call Expressives. The illocutionary point of this class is to express the psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content. The paradigms of Expressive verbs are 'thank', 'congratulate', 'apologize', 'condole', 'deplore', and 'welcome'. Notice that in expressives there is no direction of fit. In performing an expressive, the speaker is neither trying to get the world to match the words nor the words to match the world, rather the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed. Thus, for example, when I apologize for having stepped on your toe, it is not my purpose either to claim that your toe was stepped on or to get it stepped on. This fact is neatly reflected in the syntax (of English) by the fact that the paradigm-expressive verbs in their performative occurrence will not take that clauses but require a gerundive nominalization transformation (or some other nominal). One cannot say: Where E indicates the illocutionary point common to all expressives, o is the null symbol indicating no direction of fit, P is a variable ranging over the different possible psychological states expressed in the performance of the illocutionary acts in this class, and the propositional content ascribes some property (not necessarily an action) to either S or H. I can congratulate you not only on your winning the race, but also on your good looks. The property specified in the propositional content of an expressive must, however, be related to S or H. I cannot without some very special assumptions congratulate you on Newton's first law of motion.
It would be economical if we could include all illocutionary acts in these four classes, and to do so would lend some further support to the general pattern of analysis adopted in Speech Acts, but it seems to me the classification is still not complete. There is still left an important class of cases, where the state of affairs represented in the proposition expressed is realized or brought into existence by the illocutionary force-indicating device, cases where one brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist, cases where, so to speak, 'saying makes it so'. Examples of these cases are 'I resign', 'You're fired', 'I excommunicate you', 'I christen this ship, the battleship Missouri', 'I appoint you chairman', and 'War is hereby declared'. These cases were presented as paradigms in the very earliest discussions of performatives, but it seems to me they are still not adequately described in the literature and their relation to other kinds of illocutionary acts is usually misunderstood. Let us call this class Declarations. It is the defining characteristic of this class that the successful performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality, successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world: if I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman, then you are chairman; if I successfully perform the act of nominating you as candidate, then you are a candidate; if I successfully perform the act of declaring a state of war, then war is on; if I successfully perform the act of marrying you, then you are married.
The surface syntactical structure of many sentences used to perform declarations conceals this point from us because in them there is no surface syntactical distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force. Thus, 'You're fired' and 'I resign' do not seem to permit a distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content, but I think in fact that in their use to perform declarations their semantic structure is: I declare: your employment is (hereby) terminated. I declare: my position is (hereby) terminated.
Declarations bring about some alternation in the status or condition of the referred-to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed. This feature of declarations distinguishes them from the other categories. In the history of the discussion of these topics since Austin's first introduction of his distinction between performatives and constatives, this feature of declarations has not been properly understood. The original distinction between constatives and performatives was supposed to be a distinction between utterances which are sayings (constatives, statements, assertions, etc.) and utterances which are doings (promises, bets, warnings, etc.). What I am calling declarations were included in the class of performatives. The main theme of Austin's mature work, How to Do Things with Words, is that this distinction collapses. Just as saying certain things constitutes getting married (a 'performative') and saying certain things constitutes making a promise (another 'performative'), so saying certain things constitutes making a statement (supposedly a 'constative'). As Austin saw but as many philosophers still fail to see, the parallel is exact. Making a statement is as much performing an illocutionary act as making a promise, a bet, a warning or what have you. Any utterance will consist in performing one or more illocutionary acts.
The illocutionary force-indicating device in the sentence operates on the propositional content to indicate among other things the direction of fit between the propositional content and reality. In the case of representatives, the direction of fit is words-to-world, in the case of directives and commissives, it is world-towords; in the case of expressives there is no direction of fit carried by the illocutionary force because the existence of fit is presupposed. The utterance can't get off the ground unless there already is a fit. But now with the declarations we discover a very peculiar relation. The performance of a declaration brings about a fit by the very fact of its successful performance. How is such a thing possible?
Notice that all of the examples we have considered so far involve an extralinguistic institution, a system of constitutive rules in addition to the constitutive rules of language, in order that the declaration may be successfully performed. The mastery of those rules which constitutes linguistic competence by the speaker and hearer is not in general sufficient for the performance of a declaration. In addition, there must exist an extra-linguistic institution and the speaker and hearer must occupy special places within this institution. It is only given such institutions as the Church, the law, private property, the state and a special position of the speaker and hearer within these institutions that one can excommunicate, appoint, give and bequeath one's possessions or declare war. The only exceptions to the principle that every declaration requires an extralinguistic institution are those declarations that concern language itself, as for Where D indicates the declarational illocutionary point; the direction of fit is both words-to-world and world-to-words because of the peculiar character of declarations; there is no sincerity condition, hence we have the null symbol in the sincerity condition slot; and we use the usual propositional variable p.
The reason there has to be a relation of fit arrow here at all is that declarations do attempt to get language to match the world. But they do not attempt to do it either by describing an existing state of affairs (as do representatives) nor by trying to get someone to bring about a future state of affairs (as do directives and commissives).
Some members of the class of declarations overlap with members of the class of representatives. This is because in certain institutional situations we not only ascertain the facts but we need an authority to lay down a decision as to what the facts are after the fact-finding procedure has been gone through. The argument must eventually come to an end and issue in a decision, and it is for this reason that we have judges and umpires. Both, the judge and the umpire, make factual claims; 'you are out', 'you are guilty'. Such claims are clearly assessable in the dimension of word-world fit. Was he really tagged off base? Did he really commit the crime? They are assessable in the word-to-world dimension. But, at the same time, both have the force of declarations. If the umpire calls you out (and is upheld on appeal), then for baseball purposes you are out regardless of the facts in the case, and if the judge declares you guilty (on appeal), then for legal purposes you are guilty. There is nothing mysterious about these cases. Institutions characteristically require illocutionary acts to be issued by authorities of various kinds which have the force of declarations. Some institutions require representative claims to be issued with the force of declarations in order that the argument over the truth of the claim can come to an end somewhere and the next institutional steps which wait on the settling of the factual issue can proceed: the prisoner is released or sent to jail, the side is retired, a touchdown is scored. The existence of this class we may dub 'Representative declarations'. Unlike the other declarations, they share with representatives a sincerity condition. The judge, jury and umpire can, logically speaking, lie, but the man who declares war or nominates you cannot lie in the performance of his illocutionary act. The symbolism for the class of representative declarations, then, is this: as 'I state that it is raining' and 'I predict he will come' is simply, I verb (that) + S. This class, as a class, provides no further constraints; though particular verbs may provide further constraints on the lower node S. For example, 'predict' requires that an Aux in the lower S must be future or, at any rate, cannot be past. Such representative verbs as 'describe', 'call', 'classify', and 'identify' take a different syntactical structure, similar to many verbs of declaration, and I shall discuss them later. Thus, 'I promise to pay you the money' is the surface structure realization of I promise you + I will pay you the money, with equi NP deletion of the repeated I. We hear the difference in syntax between 'I promise you to come on Wednesday' and 'I order you to come on Wednesday' as being that 'I' is the deep structure subject of 'come' in the first and 'you' is the deep structure subject of 'come' in the second, as required by the verbs 'promise' and 'order' respectively. Notice that not all of the paradigm commissives have 'you' as an indirect object of the performative verb. In the sentence 'I pledge allegiance to the flag' the deep structure is not 'I pledge to you flag+ I will be allegiant'. It is I pledge+ I will be allegiant to the flag.
Directives
Whereas there are purely syntactical arguments that such paradigm directive verbs as 'order', and 'command', as well as the imperative mood require 'you' as the deep structure subject of the lower node S, I do not know of any purely syntactical argument to show that commissives require 'I' as the deep structure One cannot say *I call that he is a liar, *I diagnose that his case is appendicitis (perversely, some of my students find this form acceptable.), *I describe that John is a Fascist.
There, therefore, seems to be a very severe set of restrictions on an important class of representative verbs which is not shared by the other paradigms. Would this justify us in concluding that these verbs were wrongly classed as representatives along with 'state', 'assert', 'claim' and 'predict' and that we need a separate class for them? It might be argued that the existence of these verbs substantiates Austin's claim that we require a separate class of verdictives distinct from expositives, but that would surely be a very curious conclusion to draw since Austin lists most of the verbs we mentioned above as expositives. He includes 'describe', 'class', 'identify' and 'call' as expositives and 'diagnose' and 'describe' as verdictives. A common syntax of many verdictives and expositives would hardly warrant the need for verdictives as a separate class. But leaving aside Austin's taxonomy, the question still arises, do we require a separate semantic category to account for these syntactical facts? I think not. I think there is a much simpler explanation of the distribution of these verbs. Often, in representative discourse, we focus our attention on some topic of discussion. The deep syntactical structure of these three, respectively, is as follows:
(i) I verb NP1+ NP1 be pred. Thus, in our examples, we have I find you+ you be guilty as charged. I pronounce you+ you be man and wife. I appoint you + you be chairman.
(2) I declare+ S. Thus, in our examples we have I/we (hereby) declare + a state of war exists. I declare+ the meeting be adjourned.
